State vs Central Law: The Status of State Amendments Imbibed in the IPC and CrPC after the Implementation of New Criminal Codes
Introduction
The Indian Criminal Laws experienced a complete facelift marked by a seismic change on 1st July 2024 when the enactment of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) replaced the colonial-era Indian Penal Code (IPC), Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and Indian Evidence Act with a relatively more modern and indigenous framework aimed at expediting justice and aligning with constitutional values. Yet, this transition has given birth to a very intricate paradox that questions the fate of state-specific amendments which have been long imbibed into the IPC and CrPC, and reflect India’s quasi-federal structure under Article 254 of the Constitution. As states like Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala grapple with differences in penal provisions on issues ranging from gambling laws to preventive detention, the implementation of the new codes raises profound questions about legislative primacy, repugnancy, and the delicate balance between central standardization and regional autonomy in criminal lawmaking.
It is a very crucial issue that stands at the crux of implementing a general and consolidated law like the BNS and BNSS over numerous states which experience varied issues and have various cultural expectations from a law, which proves to be a significant point of clashing between the state and the centrally imposed law.
The legislation, while preparing the modern criminal laws, took inspiration from a lot of state amendments and inculcated them into the common codified law itself. For instance, section 111 of the BNS relating to organized crime, was directly influenced from Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) and the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015. Section 103(2) which talks about Mob-Lynching was also inspired by state amendments in Rajasthan and West Bengal. Hence, it is safe to say that the law makers took into consideration the overall aspect of the country while preparing the new laws and took initiative to minimize the conflict between old state amendments and the modern criminal jurisprudence.
Constitutional Standing
Under Article 254(1) of the Constitution, state laws on Concurrent List subjects must give way to conflicting central legislation, though Article 254(2) permits repugnant state provisions to prevail upon receiving Presidential assent. The introduction of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) elevates these new codes as the overriding “later law,” necessitating a fresh repugnancy analysis highlighting that state amendments to the IPC or CrPC that clash with BNS/BNSS provisions face implied repeal in absence of a renewed Presidential approval under Article 254(2). This doctrine finds affirmation in Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 648), where the Supreme Court upheld a Uttar Pradesh transport law validated by prior Presidential assent, yet clarified Parliament’s authority to subsequently override via the Article 254(2) proviso. In the absence of post-BNS/BNSS judicial precedents addressing such amendments, those embedded in the erstwhile IPC and CrPC stand impliedly repealed by the new criminal codes’ implementation.
The Evolution of Judicial Interpretations
In Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, [(1954) 2 SCC 345] the Supreme Court crystallized the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254, invalidating a Bombay state law imposing 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment for food grain export violations prior Presidential assent under Article 254(2). Chief Justice S.R. Das articulated three tests for conflict (direct inconsistency, implied repeal, occupied field), holding that assent validates state laws only prospectively and the Parliament’s subsequent 1950 amendment occupied the field, rendering the state provision void ab initio for repugnancy on the Concurrent List subject. This seminal ruling is foundational to federal supremacy as it implies that substantive penal divergences in state criminal law amendments demand fresh Presidential assent post-new codes, lest implied repeal under Article 254(1) prevail, ensuring central uniformity trumps regional variations.
On the other hand, in Aires Rodrigues v. Vishwajeet P. Rane [(2017) 11 SCC 62], the Supreme Court firmly maintained continuity of state issued notifications under Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 which changed the cognizability and bailability of certain IPC offences in Goa despite CrPC, 1898 being repealed by CrPC, 1973. The Court, therefore, overturned Bombay High Court’s opinion that such notifications would cease to have effect if not saved by an express provision under Section 484 CrPC. It referred to Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to explain that the references in those instruments to the old CrPC should be understood as if they were extension to the new one without their effect being lost or the necessity of getting fresh approval of the centre. The Court, thus, upheld the authority of precedents like Vinod Rao v. State of Gujarat (1980)2GLR926 and rejected the minority opinions thereby giving a strong example for the BNS/BNSS period whether procedural or interpretative changes to earlier codes can be continued through statutory interpretation. However, a material conflict with the new provisions would still lead to Article 254 challenge, that is, require new Presidential assent under Article 254(2).
Although, In the landmark judgment of Raman Sahni vs. State of U.P. [(2025) AHC-LKO 33260], the Allahabad High Court affirmed that with the repeal of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, state-level amendments tailored to the old code, specifically the U.P. Amendment Act, 2018 (Act No. 4 of 2019), have been impliedly repealed and are no longer enforceable. The Court observed that while the BNSS, 2023, serves as a re-enactment of the central procedural law, it does not verbatim retain the provisions of the old Section 438, nor does its “Repeal and Savings” clause given under Section 531 explicitly preserve existing state amendments. Invoking the Doctrine of Repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, Justice Shree Prakash Singh ruled that even in the absence of an express repeal, a later exhaustive central law on the same subject matter takes precedence, causing prior state modifications to “pale into insignificance”. Consequently, statutory barriers previously imposed by the state amendment, such as the prohibition of anticipatory bail for offenses under the U.P. Gangster Act, are currently nullified, meaning legal professionals must now refer exclusively to the provisions of the BNSS until new state amendments are formally enacted and granted presidential assent. This judgement clearly states the repugnancy of state amendments attached to former laws when new laws have occupied their space.
The Implications on Pending Proceedings
The shift from IPC to BNS is not merely academic; it affects every ongoing investigation, trial, and appeal. The government has instructed that cases registered before July 1, 2024, will continue under the IPC, while new offences will fall under the BNS. This creates a dual legal landscape that courts must navigate for years to come.
Moreover, successful implementation requires training for police officers, prosecutors, and judges, along with updates to case management systems and legal education. Without this groundwork, the new code risks becoming a rebranded version of the old law confusing practitioners and delaying justice.
Conclusion
Despite the transitional arrangements made by the Ministry of Law and Justice, the dominant legal view is that the changes made by the states to the repealed IPC and CrPC will not be considered substantively valid for the new crimes and only the new codes, BNS, BNSS, and BSA, will be considered for legal proceedings. Based on the principle of implied repeal in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, an enactment of an exhaustive code such as BNS by Parliament is said to “occupy the field”, thus any prior state amendments that are not consistent with the new framework are void. The July 16, 2024, notification permits existing references in state laws to be “read as” references to the new Sanhitas under the General Clauses Act however, this is essentially a procedural bridge and not a substantive “saving” of the amendments themselves. Since the parent Acts have been repealed, the specific textual amendments which intended to modify those sections that are now non-existent and have become unnecessary and redundant as long as they don’t attain presidential approval under Article 254(2) of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, in respect of any legal proceeding after July 1, 2024, the courts and law enforcement agencies should refer solely to the provisions of the BNS, BNSS, and BSA, as the prior state, level changes have lost their statutory basis and
as with the IPC, the true meaning BNS will unfold by the methods of judicial interpretation and courts shall play a critical role in balancing the new provisions with constitutional guarantees of free speech, equality, and due process.
